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In many aspects, political theory forms a subjective 
structure of this abstract science.  Perhaps, it is due to the 
fact that unlike natural sciences or mathematics, social 
sciences often lack the privilege of testing the theories in 
absolute and unadulterated conditions.  Nonetheless, such nature 
of the science allows for a certain degree of flexibility, when 
applying political theories to real-world phenomena.  
 Alliances and coalitions in international relations form 
the backbone of the theory, concerning IR scholars with two main 
questions: Why do alliances and coalitions form? And, what keeps 
alliances and coalitions together? As the core of my research, I 
examined NATO, as the most prominent and long-lasting alliance 
of our time, through the prism of alliance formation and 
cohesion theory introduced by George Liska.  In particular, I 
explored the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
over the term of its existence, and sought to determine whether 
Liska’s principles still apply to the contemporary situation, 
and in particular, how may the variables have altered the 
application of this scholar’s theory to our future understanding 
of alliances.   
 iii
 In its essence, this is a comparative study of the same 
alliance during the different stages of its existence. In 
particular, the comparison dissects such aspects of alliance 
theory as alignment, alliance formation, efficacy, and reasons 
for possible dissolution. 
 As a result, the study led to a conclusion, that despite 
the permutations around and within NATO, the basic realist 
principles that may explain the mechanism of this alliance’s 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has come 
under the examining eye of many scholars of international 
politics.  Since the formation of this alliance on April 4th, 
1949, its members have set their sights on protecting the 
interests of all the nations in the North Atlantic region.  This 
was seen as an appropriate response to the expanding influence 
of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.  Those goals were mainly 
of a security and strategic character, but the focus of NATO has 
expanded over the years to directly and indirectly include 
political and economic parameters as well.  The demise of the 
Soviet Union in the early 90’s rendered a majority of the 
organization’s goals and objectives obsolete.  Gone was the 
threat of the Soviet invasion into the Western Europe, gone was 
the Eastern European buffer zone, which existed for nearly half 
a century, however the NATO started seeking to fill the Eastern 
and Central European power vacuum by allowing a number of former 
Warsaw Pact states to join its ranks.  Today, NATO expansion 
debates are no longer limited to the discussion of strategic 
alignments, but have acquired a broader nature.  The role of 
NATO is also being discussed in the context of international 
policy, macroeconomics, and its relationship with the European 
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Union.  Many scholars ask a simple and straightforward question: 
Since the primary focus of the NATO’s strategic mission (which 
was the Soviet Union) has disappeared, what is the purpose of 
the alliance’s existence, let alone, its expansion? 
 This question of enduring cohesion among NATO’s member-
nations presents an interesting challenge to alliance theory 
introduced by George Liska, which particularly focuses on 
polarities and dynamics of alignment, when major core powers 
attract weaker countries into an alliance1.  The author’s logic 
regarding alignment in alliance formation is clear: a weaker 
state seeks protection from a stronger state, in response to a 
potential threat from an adversary, whereas a stronger state 
acts in self-interest, protecting the resources of the weaker 
state from incursion by the foe.  The appeal of joining an 
alliance is furthermore shaped by the perceived balance between 
the benefits and liabilities for individual members.  If the 
burdens prove to be in excess of the aggression or threat 
thereof, an alliance becomes unlikely.  In addition, the 
efficacy of any particular alliance (aside from threat 
deterrence) also lies in its ability to prevent conflict and 
improve relations among participating states, as well as its 
capacity to provide tools of consultation for those involved.  
                                                 
1 See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962),  p. 
13 
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Thus, the nature of an alliance is clearly defined as a product 
of a polarity system, with clearly identifiable ‘poles’.  That, 
not being the case in the contemporary world, leads one to 
assume that either NATO has transcended its role as a 




















CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
OVERVIEW 
 
Considering the theoretical nature of this research, basic 
research assumptions need to be established, which will be 
further elaborated later in this chapter.  First and foremost, 
the nature and internal relations of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization will be examined prior to the events of the pre-
Iraqi war divisions.  This approach is not due to the scientific 
negligence, but rather is for the sake of simplifying the 
research project. Regardless, NATO’s internal affairs following 
September 11th of 2001 reflect the endurance of the alliance 
furthermore. Second, the theoretical basis for this research 
would follow the principles, established by George Liska, where: 
a. Weaker states align themselves with core powers for the 
sake of protecting   themselves from a potential 
adversary, achieving status, and stability. 
b. Defensive alliance formation (e.g. NATO) is often 
rationalized through the function of common ideology.  
c. The efficacy of alliances lies in their capability to 
always deter the common threat. 
d. Key reasons for alliance dissolution lie in unequal 
distribution of costs and benefits (gains and 
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responsibilities), as well as the disappearance of the 
common threat.   
This explanation, albeit simple, serves as the underpinning for 
overviews of previous research in this field.   
Since the nature of this research incorporates a 
theoretical and comparative perspective, theoretical sources 
form the backbone of this research project, and therefore heavy 
emphasis was placed on selecting publications that were both 
established, in terms of academic value, as well as modern 
enough to have taken the contemporary global situation into 
account. George Liska’s Nations in Alliance has won recognition 
among IR scholars worldwide.  This 1962 publication discusses 
the main governing principles of alliance alignments, cohesion, 
dissolution, and effectiveness, as well as the future 
perspectives of alliances.  The particular appeal of Liska’s 
work lies in relative simplicity and universality of its 
theories. Despite its relative age, the level of acknowledgement 
that this work has received establishes it as a useful 
foundation for any IR theoretical research work.  Considering 
the nature of Liska’s text, and the focus of this research, the 
author’s work is directly related to the hypothesis of this 
project. Methodologically, any conclusions regarding the 
application and temporal stability of Liska’s theories would be 
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impossible to maintain, given that no alternative means of 
explaining alliance formation were examined. Therefore, a number 
of supporting theoretical texts were chosen, in order to test 
possible future hypotheses.   
The Origins of Alliances1 written by Stephen M. Walt 
presents an interesting alternative to the previously discussed 
text.  As the central hypothesis for his work, the author 
challenges the widely accepted theories of alliance alignment, 
based on exhibition of power, as well as ideological 
similarities as discussed by George Liska and Hans Morgenthau.  
He proposes that the proponents of the traditional approaches 
rarely systematically test their theories, and thus fall short 
in terms of explaining real-world circumstances. Particularly, 
Liska and Morgenthau discuss alliance matters in terms of 
balance of power, albeit their applicability of this concept is 
somewhat different.  Stephen Walt argues that Hans Morgenthau’s 
work primarily utilizes subjective evidence to support its 
points in the IR cornerstone text Politics among Nations, and 
reiterates the necessity of balance of power functions in a 
system of several states2.  In addition, Walt interprets 
Morgenthau’s arguments as suggestive of ideological solidarity 
as a valid aligning factor, and arguing that the more similar 
                                                 
1 See Stephen M. Walt,  The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987). 
2 Ibid,  p.7 
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two states are, the more likely they are to ally1.  Despite 
Walt’s disagreement with Morgenthau’s and Liska’s work over the 
lack of focus, the author’s premise for alliance formation 
argues that balancing power against potential foes is far more 
acceptable than ‘bandwagoning’, and ideological solidarity is 
usually a stronger factor when a high level of international 
security threat exists, thus borrowing and narrowing down the 
broader concepts of the aforementioned scholars2.  Stephen Walt’s 
publication is indispensable to this project from a dual 
perspective. The theoretical arguments of his research helped me 
develop a more diverse view of the seemingly similar approach to 
alliance theory.  In addition, it later served to support my 
findings, in terms of universality of the neorealist alliance 
approach.   
Michael Sullivan’s Theories of International Relations: 
Transition vs. Persistence was a valuable theoretical source, 
and includes an alternative outlook on the field of IR theory by 
challenging the neorealist theoretical approaches in 
international relations theory, which dominate the field.  
Sullivan suggests that the neorealist and neoliberalist theories 
of today are not as universal in their application, as their 
proponents may assume.  To be precise, Sullivan broaches the 
                                                 
1 See Stephen M. Walt,  The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), 
p. 33. 
2 Ibid, p. 263 
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topic of ‘chameleon’ dependent variables1, arguing that many 
contradicting scholars simply ignore the fact that different 
theories are based on different sets of variables.  Therefore, 
theories in IR would be better suited for their particular 
conditions and circumstances, versus arguing a consistent and 
unchanging dogma.  In terms of contribution to this project, 
Sullivan’s work was similar in suitability to Stephen Walt’s 
work.  The author’s interpretation of processes that lead to 
alliance formation expanded the range of my theoretical 
understanding.  Yet, in contrast, Sullivan’s principles of 
‘chameleon’ variables neither supported nor undermined my 
findings.   
Contending Theories of International Relations by James E. 
Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. is a well-known 
theoretical text, which was intended for use as a comprehensive 
textbook for advanced IR classes.  The textbook includes an 
introduction and an overview of numerous approaches to IR 
theory, as well as an overview of contemporary approaches to 
international relations theory.  Although the majority of the 
material in the textbook is not highly detailed and exhaustive, 
the text helped me set the stage for my work, by juxtaposing a 
                                                 
1 See Michael P. Sullivan, Theories of International Relations, (New York: Palgrave, 
2001), p. 5 
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number of theoretical ideas, and explaining some of the basics 
in IR theory (i.e. polarity theory). 
Since the focus of my research is to conduct a systematic 
test of alliance theories, this publication is vital to my work.  
Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen are the 
scholars responsible for collecting one of the most 
comprehensive compilations of essays on alliances within one 
single publication.  Their text Alliance in International 
Politics is separated into three specific sections, which 
include the introduction to alliance theory, general theory, and 
aspects of alliances.  The series of essays include work from 
such distinguished scholars as Hans Morgenthau, Christopher 
Bladen, Mancur Olson, and Karl W. Deutsch, as well as a number 
of other authors.  For the purpose of examining traditional 
perspectives on alliances from a number of angles, this text 
comes second to none.  The essay, particularly useful to this 
research, was an excerpt from Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among 
Nations, which laid out the precepts of the scholar’s theory on 
alliance formation.   
Morgenthau viewed alliances as a necessity for maintaining 
balance of power in the international multi-state system. 
According to that hypothesis, states seeking to improve their 
own power standing on the world arena could resort to three 
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options: a build-up of armaments, adding their influence to that 
of other states, or preventing the adversary from obtaining the 
power of other states. Regardless of the choice between the 
latter two of the options, states that choose either one of 
those paths will pursue an alliance-oriented policy1.  
Furthermore, Morgenthau made a distinction between collective 
security, and balance-of-power alliances.  Where the balance-of-
power systems place individual national interests before any 
joint action, collective security establishments are intended to 
protect collective interests, regardless of individual national 
interests.  Morgenthau’s contribution to IR field of political 
science is immeasurable, due to the impact that it had on 
shaping realist thinking in the field of alliance theory2.  
Morgenthau’s work allowed me to direct the focus of my work 
towards a neorealist approach, and use Morgenthau’s arguments as 
a backdrop for Liska’s theory.  In that manner, the article 
deepened my understanding of the matter beyond the material 
available in George Liska’s work.    
 A number of more recent articles regarding realism/neo-
realism theory have been published in scientific journals, such 
as The Journal of Conflict Resolution, International 
Organization, and World Politics.  Stephen Brooks’ article 
                                                 
1 See Hans Morgenthau, “Alliances”, in Alliance in International Politics, ed. Julian 
R. Friedman et al. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970), p. 80. 
2 Ibid, p. 92. 
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“Dueling Realisms” offers an in-depth perspective on theoretical 
differences between realist and neo-realist schools of IR 
thought.  In particular, the focus is not on structural 
similarities, but rather on differences in regards to 
assumptions about state behaviors. To be precise, Brooks argues 
that “realism diverges regarding whether the mere possibility of 
conflict conditions decision making as neorealism assumes, or 
whether actors decide between policy options based on the 
probability of conflict, as postclassical realism asserts”1. This 
article does not primarily deal with Liska’s theory, but allows 
for multi-lateral examination of state behavior in regards to 
NATO within the field of realism in IR. Despite the slight 
difference in topics, I found to be the article helpful in 
understanding the two different camps of realist thought, and 
the subject of their divergence.  Brooks’ article helped to make 
the link between the NATO’s transformation, and the 
applicability of neo-realist alliance ideas to its longevity. 
After all, if the neo-realist perspective holds true, and 
perception of the threat is a valid reason for state alignment, 
then the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new 
Russia would do nothing to alter the potential conflict 
conditions (since Russia still looms as a formidable threat).   
                                                 
1 See Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms”, International Organization, Vol. 51-3 
(Summer 1997), p. 472 
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 Perhaps, one of the most interesting articles in the field 
of realist theory, and its relation to alliances was written by 
Dan Reiter, and published in the July 1994 issue of World 
Politics.  Reiter’s article “Learning, Realism, and Alliances” 
serves as a comparative study of realist theory and learning 
theory, and the application of those theories to the principles 
of alliance formation in International Relations.  Throughout 
the article, author seeks to prove several important points: not 
only that the weaker, smaller states use historical experiences 
as their ‘rule of thumb’ for alliance choices, but levels of 
threat (a predominant alliance formation explanation among 
realists) serves only as a minor factor in the decision-making 
process.   Nonetheless, Reiter points out that one should not 
discard basic realist assumptions regarding decision-making by 
states, but rather use his findings as “an enlightened version 
of realism”1.  What makes Reiter’s work useful in my case is his 
approach to state decision-making in alliance formation, and 
offers an alternative to Liska’s view. It is indirectly linked 
to the my analysis of constraints existing within NATO. 
 The issue of NATO transformation, following the break up of 
the Soviet Union becomes the next point of interest. NATO 
Transformed by David Yost is a text that discusses the post-Cold 
                                                 
1 See Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the 
Past”, World Politics, Vol. 46-4 (July, 1994), p. 526 
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War transformation of this organization, and the modern 
challenges that it faces in maintaining itself, as well as 
following its primary goals.  Understanding the organizational 
challenges and perspectives during the process of transformation 
is an important goal of the secondary step of this research, and 
the author makes an interesting case for the evolution of this 
alliance.  Yost’s text was paramount to this research work, not 
only in the terms of its usefulness as a historical reference, 
but also as a book that expanded on the topics of NATO’s 
structural designs and transformation. 
Sean Kay’s NATO and the Future of European Security is an 
analytical examination of contemporary circumstances surrounding 
the organization.  The author uses empirical evidence to argue 
that despite the transformation of Europe after the Cold War, 
this region is still in need of NATO, as a balancing force for 
stability in the region.  His concluding comments that NATO will 
continue to exist until the region reaches its goal of 
guaranteed peace offers an optimistic perspective, regarding 
this organization’s future. Although Kay’s work was similar to 
Yost’s in applicability to this project, the author offered a 
more analytical and subjective approach to the subject of NATO 
transformation, examining the variables of internal stability.  
Moreover, Kay’s reasoning and conclusions were very similar to 
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the conclusions of this project, and underlined the relative 
suitability of the latter. 
Gale Mattox and Arthur Rachwald edited an outstanding 
collection of essays, regarding the issue of NATO enlargement, 
and the changing face of this organization under the title of 
Enlarging NATO: the National Debates.  What makes this 
publication stand out is its multi-national approach.  Articles, 
written by a world-wide array of scholars, touch upon the topic 
of enlargement from the perspectives of NATO members, potential 
members, as well as outsider-states, who are affected by the 
process.  Such design allows for a number of viewpoints, in 
regards to professional perception of changes, which take place 
within and around the alliance.  The collection of articles 
helped to expand the issues of this research beyond theoretical 
matters, by offering a number of diverse views and opinions on 
the matter.  The diversity of this publication gave essence to 
the enlargement debate, and described how various scholars 
viewed the role of NATO, and the reasons for its persistence. 
The viewpoints above all gave this work the subjective material, 
needed to build upon my arguments on NATO’s persistence. 
Journal articles have approached the topic of my research 
from diverse perspectives.  Since I intend to examine the 
transformation of NATO, as well as transformation of the United 
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States as a core power, the articles selected address those 
particular topics. 
One of the most fascinating pieces, in regards to theory 
and NATO expansion, is “Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, 
and the Core”, written by Todd Sandler in The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution.  The article uses a simple cooperative game 
theory, vastly used in IR simulation, and applies several 
variables to modern day NATO.  Despite its highly specialized 
nature, through the use of cost-benefit (gain-burden) analysis, 
the article arrives at some interesting conclusions, which can 
be related to Liska’s alignment theory, as well as general 
alliance theory.  Sandler uses the analysis of mutual defense 
game as benefit-based approach, concluding that the share of 
separate gains among allies varies greatly depending on the 
size, location, and border attributes of each alliance member. 
That, in turn, influences the position and role of the members 
within the alliance. In particular, the author uses Germany as 
an example, arguing that this state is left at a bargaining 
disadvantage, as opposed to Belgium, or Luxembourg, much due to 
the nature of its location as an ‘outside’ ally.  As such, 
Germany is left carrying a much higher defensive burden, as 
opposed to the latter members of NATO. What makes this piece 
relevant to my research is its approach to the subject of NATO 
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internal interactions and burden-gain sharing.  Sandler, in a 
way, rationalizes Liska’s alignment and alliance formation 
concepts through game theory.  
Robert J. Art’s “Why Western Europe Needs the United States 
and NATO” is an analytical essay, published in the Spring 1996 
issue of Political Science Quarterly.  Like many of his fellow 
scholars, Art joins the debate on the realities of NATO’s 
transformation from a tool of collective anti-Soviet security 
into an active ‘security blanket’ over Western Europe.  
Furthermore, Art elaborates on the specific role of the United 
States within NATO: “America’s balancing role is a principal 
instrument that helps keep both external threats and internal 
fears from corroding Western Europe’s cohesion”1.  In many 
respects, Art’s article touches upon the same topics as Sean 
Kay’s piece. What makes it different and so useful for my 
research is the take on the role of the United States in the 
alliance. Art’s take on the U.S. role in NATO, coupled with 
Liska’s concepts of internal checks and balances shaped my 
understanding of intra-NATO politics, and aligning factors, 
before and after Soviet disintegration.  
                                                 
1 See Robert J. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO”, Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 111-1 (Spring, 1996), p. 38 
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Robert McCalla’s “NATO’s Persistence after Cold War” 
unifies a number of topics within this research project.  First 
of all, it debates NATO’s possibilities for action, following 
the break-up of Soviet Union, citing a number of historical 
events, which led to transformation of alliances.  Next, McCalla 
turns to theoretical arguments of NATO’s persistence, arguing 
that alliance theory scholars have generally limited their scope 
of interest to reasons for alliance formation and cohesion, 
rather than reasons for alliance dissolution.  Stepping away 
from the non-realist approach, McCalla turns to a ‘two-table’ 
analysis, exploring the internal constraints of the NATO 
members, besides just the external constraints, so familiar to 
the realist school of thought.  The internal constraints, which 
McCalla addresses, are domestic policy pressures, exerted on the 
makers of foreign policy by their domestic political 
organizations and factions1. Next, the author examines the 
application of organizational theory, and realist theory to 
NATO’s evolution, explaining the factors and outcomes which 
occurred according to those theories. As a result, McCalla’s 
examination of post-Cold War NATO contributed to understanding 
of the neorealist paradigm, supplementing it, rather than 
                                                 
1 See Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International 
Organization, Vol. 50-3 (Summer, 1996), p. 446 
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rejecting its canons. In terms of applicability to my research, 
McCalla’s work is the most relevant piece of all, which helped 
me gain understanding of domestic pressures on NATO from a 
practical world perspective. Besides, since the topics of 
McCalla’s work and this research are closely related, it served 
as a reference on final findings and conclusions.  
 A number of other articles have been reviewed, and used to 
supplement my existing knowledge of the subject, rather than 
branching the existing knowledge.  However, if one had to 
summarize the current level of understanding in my area of 
research, the outcome would be as follows: 
a. George Liska’s work is recognized for its contribution 
to alliance theory; however, numerous alternative 
theories and views exist.  Many scholars affirm that 
realist/neorealist theory lacks flexibility, and could 
be improved by supplementing various circumstantial 
variables. 
b. NATO has defied theoretical canons by continuing to 
exist in the absence of threat, but a new interpretation 
of alliance theory suggests that the narrow scope of 
realist theory is to blame for such miscalculations.  
McCalla’s and Sandler’s articles expand on the existing 
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theoretical knowledge by supplementing the theory with 
outside (non-realist) perspectives. 
c. The role of the United States and the state’s strategy 
for NATO participation are inseparable from the fate of 
NATO.  While some see the US as a military balancing 
power, others see its presence as beneficial to economic 






















CHAPTER 3: CORE ALLIANCE THEORY AND SUPPORTING THEORIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
   
Although it may seem logical to overview strictly George 
Liska’s theory of alliances, it is quite unwise to take his 
realist premises out of context.  Therefore, it is paramount 
that another side of IR theory be addressed – that being the 
structural-realist systems theory and the concepts of systemic 
polarity within systemic structures.  Dougherty et al addresses 
systemic IR and political theories in great detail, and defines 
systemic polarity as the amount of political actors, and the 
“distribution of capabilities among them”1.  According to this 
notion, the specific polarity implies the structure of the 
system itself, and therefore would dictate actions within the 
system, which would further indicate how the actors within the 
system align along the poles.  To be precise, polarity theory 
elaborates that major actors-antagonists tend to separate the 
international system into a number of sectors, whether 
ideologically, politically, or geographically.  Those sectors 
and their capacities, in turn, dictate the amount of power that 
a certain state can impose on the other actors within the 
                                                 
1 See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International 
Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 100 
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system.  Therefore, the systemic distribution of state 
capacities would also dictate its need to align itself with 
other actors in the system, which would then increase its 
influence among the major actors within the system.  
Karl Deutsch and David Singer contribute a critical piece 
of knowledge to polarity theory by theorizing that an bipolar 
systems are more prone to war than multipolar systems, simply 
because the actors within the multipolar international system 
have more freedom to interact with other actors outside the 
confines of alliances, than those that are bound by blocs of 
coalitions imposed by the bipolar system.  Simply put, more 
poles in the multipolar system maximize the number of potential 
interactions, but also reduce the intensity and range of 
conflicts, when those occur between the actors1. Deutsch and 
Singer’s model also cites the potential for instability, due to 
lack of interaction, and thus reduced number of “cross-cutting 
loyalties that reduce hostility between any single dyad of 
nations”2. The contribution made to the polarity theory by Edward 
Mansfield was also quite important to understanding the role of 
alliances and the nature of alignment in International 
Relations.  This scholar suggested that there are implications 
in this field of theory that reach far beyond the number of 
                                                 
1 See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International 
Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 119 
2 Ibid, p. 119 
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poles in the system, and related particularly to the 
distribution of power among the actors in the system.  In 
particular, that relates to the stability of the system due to 
equal distribution of power among major actors, and the 
equilibrium is strictly dependent on the ability of one major 
actor or the other to increase its capabilities, or form 
alliances with lesser actors1.  Understanding of polarity theory, 
as it relates to modern day NATO is quite important, considering 
that NATO was a stability-generating counterweight to Warsaw 
Pact imbalance between the two major actors in the bipolar 
system – the same principle, suggested by Mansfield.  
 Despite a wide acceptance of the basic premises of polarity 
theory, many scholars disagreed on the efficacy of the Deutsch-
Singer paradigm on higher stability of the multipolar IR system.  
In particular, the key criticism contends that with fewer major 
actors and a higher level of confidence in the diplomatic 
relations between the major actors, the possibility of conflict 
among those actors would decrease due to a lower chance for 
misunderstanding between the actors2. Scholars, such as Ronald 
Yalem, had the opportunity to examine the emergence of China as 
a third superpower, and further elaborated the implications of 
multipolarity as a source of instability.  By increasing the 
                                                 
1 See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International 
Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 120 
2 Ibid, p. 120 
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number of bilateral interactions the possibility for conflict 
would exponentially increase, therefore trusting the fate of 
international stability to each pole’s ability to prevent 
bipolar alignment against it, as well as resist the temptation 
to enter into such an alignment against another actor1.  Studies, 
conducted by Singer and Melvin Small, could to prove or disprove 
a correlation between the principles of polarity and likelihood 
of war, thus rendering the debate unfruitful. 
However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave scholars 
an opportunity to track changes in the structural composition of 
the international system.  Particularly outspoken in regards to 
unforeseen changes has been John Mearsheimer, who contended that 
the disappearance of the bipolar division in Europe was the key 
reason for Balkan wars of the 1990s: “Although the particular 
wars that broke out had specific and unique cases and origins, 
it was the power imbalance that permitted such factors to lead 
to the outbreak of hostilities.”  According to his theory, this 
transformation, coupled with re-emergence of the united Germany 
and the decline of US influence in the region, led to power 
instability due to establishment of a multipolar regional 
political system, previously deterred by military equality 
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between the two key players in the region (Soviet Union and the 
US)1.  
 The analysis of the neorealist-structural realist debate on 
the efficacy of polarity theory, as well as its iterations is 
not the focus of this work. Nonetheless, recognition of the 
principles of this theory would lead one to understand alignment 
principles further set forth in Liska’s alliance theory, and 
would give a keener eye for analyzing discrepancies in the 
theory, as applied to modern-day NATO, once set against the 
background of realist polarity theory. With that in mind, moving 
on to an assessment and analysis of George Liska’s theory would 
be most plausible.   
 
 
ALLIANCE ALIGNMENT THEORY 
In many ways, scholars are oftentimes concerned with the 
manner in which states formed an alliance, how it operated, or 
why it was dissolved, oftentimes omitting a key inquiry into 
how, specifically, the states wound up in a position favorable 
to alliance formation.  After all, formation of alliances would 
not occur without specific pre-conditions, which necessitate 
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states’ movement towards a limiting union.  In his theoretical 
work, George Liska identifies state alignments and realignments 
as primary intra-systemic movements of actors within the 
international system.  By far, key factors for such movements 
are identified by the scholar as conflicts.  When the security 
of the state becomes the chief concern of its leadership, and 
the conflict is sufficiently intense, the latter becomes the 
chief determining factor in alignment movements1.  A critical 
reader may argue that economic and trade priorities often top 
conflict factors as key aligning causes, however, one must 
remember that this analysis targets a specific military alliance 
(NATO), and moreover, the staying power of trade factors is 
weaker, being restricted by fears of economic dependence and 
opportunities for outside trade2.  Therefore, for the purposes of 
establishing theoretical basics, alliances are created against 
someone, and therefore, exist for someone’s specific purposes, 
with cooperation between states being a result of conflicts with 
rival states.  Liska illustrates the dynamics of alignments 
between states through giving an example of a bipolar system, 
where core-power states are surrounded by weaker states, where 
the latter are consequently pulled into alliances.  Albeit, such 
a move is nothing new to the international community, the 
                                                 
1 See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 12 
2 Ibid, p. 14 
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factors underscoring such movement may be quite different from 
popular perception.  In fact, the core states’ appeal does not 
stem from their ability to flex the iron muscle, since in its 
essence superior power does not attract.  In fact, alignment 
between a core power and weaker states would come only as a 
result of a conflict (or a threat thereof) of the latter with 
another strong power.  As a matter of fact, alignment without a 
conflict is unfavorable for either the strong or the weak state, 
stretching the resources and commitments of the former and 
threatening individuality of the latter.  Thus, the influencing 
attraction of the superior power of a core state comes as a 
result of repulsion of the weaker state by another core state, 
and in its turn, the core state benefits from getting access to 
weaker state’s resources and from restraining its adversary from 
those resources.  Obscuring this reason for alignment and 
alliance formation are the accessibility factors: “For such 
tendencies and objectives to result in alignment, the lesser 
state must be accessible to the potential ally directly or at 
least indirectly”1.  Simplifying this notion, Liska reaffirms 
that indirect access could be as limited as the stronger state’s 
ability to exert political or military pressure on the weaker 
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state’s adversaries, and does not necessitate geographic 
proximity between the two potential allies.   
 Conflicts, which lead to alignments, may manifest 
themselves on a number of different scales: global, regional, 
and domestic.  The emerging patterns in alignment will reflect 
not only the constraints imposed on actor-states by the dominant 
conflict (one, which is likely to change the entire system), but 
also will be shaped by conflicts that are key to specific 
subsets of nations. Liska underscores that in many ways those 
non-dominant conflicts reveal themselves in regional politics, 
and serve to ‘fill out’ the alignment patterns, and determine 
global alignments1.  Therefore, conflicts such as the ever-
ongoing Middle Eastern turmoil may not always be the dominant 
global focal point, but its regional significance to the global 
system has led to continuing involvement of powers from the 
outside of the region (like the United States, and Soviet Union 
in the 1960s).  As influential as regional sub-systems can be on 
the terms of alignments, one should not lose sight of domestic 
factors as well.  When a nation is subject to an internal 
conflict, the conflicting sides attempt to involve outside 
forces (read, core powers) in order to add feasible credibility 
                                                 




to their actions.  Thus, when two or more internal parties to a 
conflict align themselves with different outside forces, the 
internal conflict becomes a part of an international system.  If 
only one party to a conflict aligns itself then the opposing 
sides will seek to either neutralize the group’s influence and 
activity on the domestic scale, or will seek alignments with 
outside forces themselves1.  One may ask the reason for such 
detailed explanation of alignment scales, but it is significant 
not to lose sight of three main questions of alignment and 
alliance formation: “why?”, “with whom?”, and “how much?” (in 
regards to strength of commitment).  Since this chapter has 
already touched upon the questions of “why?” (threat deterrence 
is key), and “with whom?”, the explanation of conflict scales 
serves to explain the last question of “how much?”, as well as 
provide additional explanation to the previous questions.   
 As a recap of alignment reasons, allow me to touch upon the 
key points of this portion of Liska’s theory: 
a. Alignments are the means for balance-of-power 
adjustments.  According to Liska “alliances aim at 
maximizing gains and sharing liabilities”2. 
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b. States enter into alliances in order to prevent or 
reduce the influence of an opposing power, by maximizing 
their own capabilities, and are driven by national 
interests. 
c. Alignments are performed between a core power, and 
weaker states, each side experiencing limited benefits 
from mutual security and shared resources. 
d. Geographical proximity between allies is not a key 
factor, and deficiencies can be supplemented by 
ideological, cultural, or economic interests.  What 
matters most is mutual ‘accessibility’ between allies, 
however subjective it may be. 
e. Various scales of alignment (global, regional, 
domestic), as well as scales of conflict (dominant or 
non-dominant) affect the nature of the alignment and the 
amount of commitment to a specific alliance, resulting 
from an alignment.   
Speaking generally, those five points summarize the basic 
premises of Liska’s alignment theory.  It would be most sensible 
to move forth to a discussion of how and why alliances stay 




GEORGE LISKA’S PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE COHESION 
 Since it has been established by realist dogmas, as 
manifested in Liska’s work, that alliances operating within a 
systemic framework of international relations seek  
alignment with like actors for purposes of maximizing mutual 
capabilities and serving as a collective deterrent to potential 
aggression, it becomes necessary to examine underlying factors, 
which allow an alliance to perform its functions, cooperate, and 
remain united in doing so.  Simply put, it is an examination of 
how gains are achieved, liabilities are distributed, and 
participation is enforced.   
 As a part of elaboration of cohesive factors in alliance 
theory, ideology serves as the primary focus of George Liska’s 
work on the topic.  The author summarizes the goal of his 
inquiry: “If allies are to stay together despite setbacks, the 
grounds for alliance must be rationalized”1.  Naturally, this 
rationale seeks its foundation in ideology – a form of political 
‘glue’, validating states’ reasons for constraining themselves 
in a union.  Furthermore, Liska argues, the presence of common 
ideology serves to transform a previously cumbersome union into 
an operational social institution by outlining the foundation 
and limits of the alliance’s shared aims, so as to give separate 
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states a common incentive for joint action, as well as to 
outline the character, intentions, and capacity of common 
threats and rationales for uniting against them1.         
 By and large, the characteristics of ideology, which 
underscore an alliance, vary according to their primary purpose.  
For example, offensive alliances are oftentimes driven by 
perspectives of mutual gain, overrun by ideological hegemony of 
the core state, whereas defensive alliances tend to use ideology 
as means of uniting the citizens of participating states into a 
fabric of friendship and common interest.  Key to a successful 
transformation of perspective common goals into a working 
ideology is the core state capacity to stress common gains and 
interest, and downplay or ignore existing differences among the 
potential allies2.  After all, efficacy of any alliance is 
strictly dependent upon its ability to carry out joint goals 
with minimal disagreement among members.  Another goal of 
successful ideological implementation must address the two 
different positions – nationalist or associationist -- that 
potential allies may assume, when alliance is constructed.  The 
nationalist position dictates that alliance ideology is a smart 
disguise for attempts at hegemonic rule over the allied states 
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by the strongest ally, as well as the resulting conclusion that 
such rule would be equally as unbearable as one imposed by the 
enemy1.  Associationist position is by far more pragmatic, which 
follows a somewhat impromptu approach to cooperation, which may 
or may not result in cooperation, which, in turn, may or may not 
become formalized.  The two contrasting positions characterize 
not only the nature, which the alliance would assume, but also 
pre-conditions alliance cohesion and dissolution principles.  In 
many ways, the nationalist approach has been characteristic of 
states without immediate and imminent threats to security (i.e. 
United States), and has galvanized important policy agenda 
within those alliances that such states did enter:  
a. “[T]he struggle with the adversary must not be allowed 
to obscure the duty of self-assertion within the 
alliance.”2 
b. “Once in the alliance… [the] power strives for 
supremacy, under the cover of solidarity, and practices 
expediency under the cover of principle.”3 
The author also comments that the nationalist ally should 
be expected to leave the alliance first, or as soon as he can; 
oftentimes, separate peace arrangements, or redistribution of 
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liabilities will take place, in order to make such exit 
possible.   
Associationist ideology, on the other hand, takes a more 
deliberate approach to establishment of formalized ties.  The 
tendency of such allies to wait for special considerations from 
the stronger ally, ones that allow them to avoid triggering 
conflicts of interest with the other states.  Most importantly, 
the manifested necessity for participation in alliance is 
reaffirmed by an associationist state through firm belief in 
making the alliance function1.  
Clearly, the different approaches to ideology and alliance 
participation characterize the nature of the alliance itself, 
giving one an opportunity to make assumptions in regards to the 
future of the particular union. Moreover, the particular 
ideological approach to the matter of alignment and 
participation in an alliance, also condition the manner in which 
‘business’ is conducted within the alliance; to be specific, the 
diplomatic style would vary according to the manner, in which a 
specific ally perceives its role within the alliance.  Formal 
style generally pertains to a state, careful as not to demean 
its role and status within the alliance, where “informality is a 
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luxury for the secure”1, characteristic of states, which possess 
a greater level of security.   
In their innate nature, alliances are a complex political 
structure: not in the terms of international politics, but in 
the terms of internal operations.  To this extent, consultation 
becomes an important cohesive tool, and serves as an indicator 
of the type of relations between the allies.  In some respects, 
consultation is similar in nature to negotiations, however, the 
amount of confidence in outcomes of a particular negotiation is 
oftentimes much higher than that for a consultation.  Sharing 
similar goals with negotiations (that of settling a particular 
controversy to avoid direct conflict), consultation, however, is 
a more intricate process, which is characterized by a sense of 
community between allies2.  The notion of community is brought 
about through an arrangement of joint action within an alliance, 
and therefore, allowing the process to serve as a reflection of 
solidarity among allies, and cohesion within the alliance.  On 
the other hand, the role of consultation as a form of restraint 
among allies also characterizes it as means of upholding mutual 
security.  In a sense, in a formal security arrangement, which 
calls for unilateral collective action, allies place faith in 
consultation as a means of maintaining peace by preventing 
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individual member-states from jeopardizing the arrangement 
through unsolicited endeavors.  As a result, consultation could 
serve as means of reassurance among members that the structure 
they belong to is based upon firm precepts of solidarity. 
Nonetheless, just like negotiations, consultation is a direct 
method for resolving differences among alliance members.  
The result of any successful consultation, unless it is 
strictly formalistic, or serves strictly as means of information 
exchange, is a compromise. Essentially, compromise becomes an 
operational assurance of solidarity and cohesion within the 
alliance, and illustrates that partners in alliances will 
sacrifice some of the national interests for the good of the 
union.  Cohesion of the alliance is then further promoted, when 
implicit compromises are established, and allies are willing to 
concede to each others unilateral decisions.  Liska writes on 
this matter:   
[T]he cohesion of an alliance grows as it  
develops the capacity to absorb fait accomplis, 
especially if previous consultation accomplished 
little or nothing.1
 However, when allies cannot come to an acceptable 
compromise, the alliance community can follow several patterns 
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of coercive behavior.  One of the least obvious challenges that 
precede compromises (or their lack) is the ability of consensus 
building, not only among the members, but also on the domestic 
scale.  Certainly, such circumstances would be dependent on the 
nature of the compromise, as well as on the particular system of 
domestic governance of the state in question: it is much more 
difficult to build consensus on an issue in a democratic state 
than in an autocratic one.  Limits of cohesion are furthermore 
stretched in times of instability or in dire circumstances.  
When internal pressures overwhelm the domestic system, member-
state may ‘lag’ in accepting certain actions or performing 
necessary feats.  External pressures also play an important role 
in determining the course of action for a particular state, 
however, in a democratic system, internal pressures oftentimes 
overwhelms external influences. When compromises or tacit and 
formal agreements fail, fellow allies may exert pressure upon 
the ally in question by realigning themselves within the union, 
therefore threatening to isolate the one, responsible for the 
conflict1.   
 Matters of alliance cohesion are complex and difficult to 
assess, however, theoretical assessment would be easier to 
                                                 




follow if some basic principles of alliance cohesion are 
summarized, as follows: 
a. Ideology defines the foundation of an alliance, 
rationalizing the need for its existence. Nationalist or 
associationist approaches to ideology define the nature 
of relations within the alliance. 
b. Beyond ideological precepts, alliances are guided by 
formal agreements, tacit accords, as well as formal and 
informal consultations. 
c. Internal and external pressures dictate states’ actions, 
elaborated by their commitment to the cause of an 
alliance.   
d. When a member-state fails to perform its functions 
within the alliance due to pressures or fear thereof, 
other members can exert pressure by realigning 
themselves within the alliance, and therefore, posing a 
threat of isolation to a deviant state.   
As a sum, cohesion of alliances is a diplomatic 
matter far more refined than any relations among the 
adversaries, requiring diplomatic balance and skill for lasting 




LISKA’S THEORY ON EFFICACY OF ALLIANCES 
“To be efficacious, alliance policy must fit the prevailing 
environment and the trends perceptible in it”1, said George Liska 
in his assessment of the contemporary international system.  
More or less, this judgment establishes and defines the 
practical side of Liska’s theoretical foundations of alliance 
efficacy.  His discussion of alliance efficacy particularly 
targets defensive alliances (as opposed to alliances formed for 
possible aggressive action), and examines the conditions, which 
dictate the way allies deter the common enemy, control the 
measure of the conflict, as well as restrain and coerce each 
other2.  
  As discussed previously, reasons for alignment and 
ideological underpinnings will include joint capacities and 
increased capabilities, which in turn would serve to promote 
alliance cohesion.  However commonsense those may be, the author 
warns of the counter-effects of such ideological approaches as 
prohibitive of any alternative measures of achieving their goals 
of national security (whether, in alternative arrangements, or 
on their own)3.  Another externality of excessive measures of 
cohesion would manifest itself in decreasing national ‘face 
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value’ in the international political arena: bloc-voting in the 
UN on matters other than the immediate security concerns of the 
alliance would make the best example.  The concerns of military 
integration versus independence dominated the political 
discourse among Western allies, challenging standing 
understandings regarding the level of involvement among allies 
and their capacity for individual actions, when national 
interests prevail.  Nonetheless, Liska outlines three particular 
areas, which could be successfully integrated without entirely 
limiting individual national interests: 
a. Military field command, coordinated through mutual 
consultation among allies. 
b. Transportation, communication, and logistics facilities, 
once again, ruled by mutual consultation and command. 
c. At last, specialization in individual contributions to 
the joint effort, to the best of nations’ abilities1.  
The author also underscores the importance for mutual 
consultation in strategy development among nations, drafting 
premises for evaluating measures of cooperation in the face of 
judging policy decisions.  The characteristics, favored as 
cohesive factors, seemingly falter before the challenges of the 
                                                 




modern day diplomatic status quo.  Size of alliances seems to 
matter less than their capacity for efficient operation, 
national self-assertion among allies, as well as their ability 
to be flexible in realizing their strategic goals as a part of 
the alliance.  In a sense, where a realist approach sees the 
modern system as restrictive towards choices of alignment (few 
powers to align to), it gives way to intra-alliance flexibility, 
in regards to carrying out internal goals.  Liska coins that 
particular approach as ‘selective or dual-purpose integration’, 
attributing to it greater capacity, simply because allies are 
driven to act together not because they absolutely must, but 
because they wish to do so1.  Thus, the level of commitment 
towards a common goal, as well as level of alliance integration 
serves to control the span of potential or existing conflicts, 
as well as the adversary.  Selective integration operates in 
select periods of activity, and can become an effective 
deterrent, demonstrating the ability of allies to raise levels 
of commitment, depending on the intensity of the conflict. 
Moreover, such matters serve to prolong the life of an alliance, 
giving it temporal durability in the face of conflict, and 
provocations from an adversary.   
                                                 




Efficacy of dual-purpose integration is furthermore 
promoted by the arrangement’s ability to serve as an intra-
alliance restraint, covering all three matters of alliance 
restraining function (adversary, conflict, and allies).  
Although formal provisions for consultation prior to conflict 
escalation have been common among allies, allowing foreign bases 
on national soil served as an efficient means of restraint among 
allies.  Oftentimes, by imposing limits on numbers of foreign 
troops on its soil, a state can control its fellow allies’ 
ability to escalate a conflict with an adjacent nation.  
Although it does seem like a far cry from effective conflict 
prevention, and may give way to dissent among alliance members, 
military base regulations may compel compromises, strategic 
consultation, and restraint within an alliance.   
Overall, the efficacy of alliances is a multifaceted 
matter, outlining alliance functions in regards to restraint of 
the adversary, conflict, and fellow allies, but it could be 
summarized in three of Liska’s precepts: 
a. Alliances deter common adversaries by practicing 
flexibility, and protecting national interests on 
the world scale.  Flexibility and durability of any 
alliance could be a successful deterrent in its own 
right. 
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b. States limit the scope of the conflict by deterring 
the adversary, as well as by effectively deterring 
other members of an alliance from escalating the 
conflict by means of consultation, compromise, and 
coercion. 
c. States channel the actions of other member-states 
through controlling the amount of commitment to a 
particular issue, managing military resources, and 
contributing to joint military goals.     
Having discussed the issues of alliance alignment, 
cohesion, and functional efficacy, it would be best suited to 
observe George Liska’s theoretical principles for alliance 
dissolution.  After all, the volatile nature of modern day 
political systems serves to showcase best that dissent among 
members and potential dissolution may face just about any 
arrangement, regardless of speculated levels of commitment, and 
similarity in ideological constraints. 
 
GEORGE LISKA ON ALLIANCE DISSOLUTION 
 The decrease in cohesion among allies due to the advances 
in warfare (less dependence on other allies) did not bring about 
the expected outcomes of multipolarization.  In effect, the 
claims for multipolarity could be attributed to the changing 
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political situation, which somewhat decreased military 
dependence among allies, however, Liska states that “adversary 
alliance systems remain the key factors in the contemporary 
international system”1.  In many respects, Liska’s analysis of 
the contemporary politics could be attributed to the nature of 
IR politics in the 1960’s, when his work was published; however, 
stipulations of future outcomes among alliances in the 1960’s 
outline his premises for alliance de-alignments in general.  As 
a comparative examination of the Warsaw Pact and western 
alliances, Liska stresses the important capacity of Western 
allies to find premises for existence beyond those of the 
autocratic ideological character2.  That attribute could also be 
added to the ability of Western nations to integrate their 
military capabilities in the field – a feat that was 
unsuccessful among Eastern allies.  Therefore, the comparison 
underscores the ability of Western nations to follow the 
doctrine of alliance alignment and formation: the ability to 
evenly or justly distribute gains and responsibilities.  Thus, 
an alliance (no matter how strong it is ideologically) may 
suffer debilitating strains, or even disintegrate, when 
distribution of gains and responsibilities no longer stays even.  
When the situation is further complicated by internal restraints 
                                                 
1 See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 
169 
2 Ibid, p. 170 
 43
among allies, and the balance of gains to responsibilities in 
thrown off, the organization will face a serious crisis1.  The 
crisis, furthermore, could take several different patterns: 
a. If the major restraining force or actor is the core 
power, that power may have to relax the restraints, or 
face the restrained nation’s ‘shake off’ of the 
restraints through the balance of military capabilities. 
b. The ensuing international conflict (followed by 
relaxation of restraints) may be enough to cool off a 
deviating ally.  If the ally pursues the conflict, 
rupture or complications are imminent. 
c. If the adversary is not attractive to the restrained 
state, a conflict will take toll on both the core power 
and the restrained power. If the adversary has some 
means of attracting the lesser power, it is unlikely to 
sacrifice its national security to the strains of the 
restrictive alliance2. 
As a result of his analysis of the Western and Eastern 
alliance systems, George Liska concludes that alliances in 
future diplomatic relations would face the need to accommodate 
growing national capacities, and find means of relieving strains 
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and controls among their fellow member-states without exerting 
rupturing force, which can bring about dealignment.  On the 
other hand, relaxation of ties between allies should not allow 
the adversary to be able to divide and alienate them for the 
sake of future conflicts1. 
 
 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF GEORGE LISKA’S THEORY 
 Although the systemic-realist theory of George Liska was by 
far one of the most well developed, and reflective theories of 
its time, the academic community of IR scholars continued the 
elaboration of his premises, as well as the creation of new 
ideas on the subject.  A prime example of such elaboration came 
in the shape of a growing debate about the nature of realism, 
and the diverging paths that neorealism and postclassical 
realism takes.  Although this debate does not directly focus on 
the specific aspects of alliance formation and alignments, it 
does weigh heavily on the issues of state roles and views, and 
their resulting actions in the world arena.   
An article by Stephen G. Brooks published in 1997 in 
International Organization summarizes the key ideas of this 
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dispute among scholars.  First and foremost, Brooks 
differentiates between the two branches of realism by explaining 
how conflict conditions state actions: in the case of 
postclassical realism, states’ actions are believed to be 
conditioned by the probability of aggression, whereas in the 
case of neorealism, the same actions are conditioned by the 
possibility of conflict.  In addition, differences exist 
regarding the precepts of temporal constraints on state 
decisions: neorealists argue that states, conditioned by their 
worst-case scenario decision-making, prefer short-term military 
concentration, and base their decisions on those short term 
goals; postclassical realists, on the other hand, see the trade-
offs of short-term and long-term effects, and interchange them 
equally.  Finally, the pessimistic approach to decision-making, 
favored by the neorealists, contends that military preparedness 
will always dominate the policy-making process. Postclassical 
realists argue, however, that states weigh the risks associated 
with potential security losses versus economic gains, and make 
rational choices accordingly.1
 In a nutshell, this serves to illustrate that Liska’s 
theory, which focuses so heavily on security risks and threats 
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strictly follows the neorealist path, omitting the detailed 
analysis and explanation of economic principles in alliance 
formation and alignment.  In addition, such differentiation 
between the two branches of realism alone poses an interesting 
dilemma: can one single theory of alignment be applied to such a 
dynamic environment, or can this divergence serve as an 
explanation of a multi-systemic structure of European allied 
governance, manifested through the co-existence of the European 
Union and NATO? 
Game theories, used by William Riker and Glenn Snyder, 
sought to illustrate the process that states go through, in 
search of security, trading off for potential encroachment by 
the allies.  Nonetheless, Stephen M. Walt in The Origins of 
Alliances debated the reliability of their arguments, reflecting 
on the Snyder’s and Riker’s neglect of geographical and 
ideological factors in their pay-off analysis.1   
In a sense, Walt sought to further elaborate Liska’s aging 
theory in a publication, which would be more reflective of the 
recent political structures and behavior.  Walt examines the 
alignment and alliance formation as a result of two different 
motions and initiatives by the actor-states.  Alliance building, 
as a balancing behavior, could be seen as an explanation, 
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similar to Liska’s concepts of balance of power.  On the other 
hand, Walt further elaborates on state behavior by introducing 
the concept of bandwagoning behavior, which he explains by the 
attractions of strength and potential spoils, where states join 
either for the sake of conciliation, or in hopes of potential 
gains. In addition, ideological initiatives may impose catalytic 
effects on alignment of weaker states to a stronger state, where 
the social and ideological structure of the state is easily 
penetrable1. To a degree, this may serve to explain the behavior 
of the states within NATO, if one were to juxtapose their level 
of cohesion to the principles of the alliance and their social 
and ideological penetrability.   
In a sense, the greatest challenge of this research topic 
was to focus on the ability to explain the existing conditions, 
without practical potential to forecast the future developments 
in theory, as a result of world events.  Michael P. Sullivan, in 
Theories of International Relations, writes:  
Theory and ‘real world’ constantly badger and hound 
each other, the former straining to corral the latter, 
and the latter racing away, producing a necessary 
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tension in an ‘interactive’ mode because both 
dimensions…are dynamic1. 
Being able to find the fine balance within this work between the 
numerous theoretical constraints and real world facts would mark 
the ability to test the hypothetical questions for either 

















                                                 
1 See Michael P. Sullivan, Theories of International Relations, (New York: Palgrave, 
2001), p. 16 
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CHAPTER 4: THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION --  
ROOTS OF AN ALLIANCE 
  
Considering the turmoil of the 20th century international 
relations and diplomacy, few would disagree that no alliance or 
alignment has proven more enduring than the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO).  Established in mid-20th century, the 
alliance has seen its share of internal and external pressures, 
but has maintained and even expanded its power over the years.  
That survival has served as a factor for attracting numbers of 
scholars, seeking to explain the shifting character of NATO. 
 The years following the end of World War II were filled 
with challenges and tribulations for all parties to the 
conflict.  The victors buried their dead and struggled to 
rebuild whatever was left of their shattered infrastructures.  
Solidarity in victory gave hope for new beginnings in diplomatic 
relations between countries, which were on the opposite sides of 
the ideological sphere. Those hopes were short lived. In Europe, 
external pressures for formation of a defensive alliance 
developed at a frightening pace. Following disagreements over 
zones of influence in post-war Germany, it became painfully 
evident that the path chosen for post-war development by the 
Soviet Union was far different from those of its former Western 
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allies.  The expansionist ideological policies of the Soviet 
Communist Party, and the control that it had imposed on its 
Eastern European neighbors generated well-grounded fears in 
regards to Soviet Western expansion into the North-Atlantic 
states.   
As a result, five Western European nations (Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) 
settled on establishing a common defense system, and 
furthermore, promoting their international ties in economic, 
political, and cultural spheres, which would allow them to 
resist Eastern ideological, political, and military threats1.  
The effective starting point for this alignment was formalized 
in the March 1948 Treaty of Brussels, which brought up adding 
seven other nations (Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Norway, 
the United States, and Canada) into this budding alliance. This 
was finally formalized in April 1949 in the Treaty of 
Washington, which effectively secured the North Atlantic 
European and North American community from the threat of Soviet 
aggression.  Turkey and Greece entered into the Treaty in 1952, 
shortly followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. The 
commitment was to distribute the benefits and responsibilities 
of collective security among member-states.  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
1 The historical background of the NATO inception and development was obtained from 
the lastest edition of the NATO Handbook (See NATO Office of Information and Press, 
NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), ch. 1-2) 
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treaty restricted those states from entering any other alliances 
or agreements, which would conflict with the interests of this 
newly-established union1. 
The basis for the establishment of the alliance has been 
discussed in its historical context. However, from the 
perspective of theoretical means, the contributors to the 
alliance sought to create a universal security establishment, 
which would reach farther than that of just an anti-Soviet 
security blanket. Specifically, the NATO Handbook avers that 
“[t]he fundamental principle underpinning the Alliance is a 
common commitment to mutual cooperation among the member states, 
based on the indivisibility of their security”2.  The 
affirmations of mutual security, nonetheless, include individual 
sovereignty, and the freedom of the states, and establish mutual 
security guarantees in the meantime.  Having established the 
conditions for cooperation among the members, NATO found it 
essential to move on to the discussion of the principles of 
mutual cooperation among member-states, by focusing on the 
benefits, responsibilities, and mechanisms of cooperation.   
Although the NATO Handbook appears to be one of the most 
exhaustive publications on the matters of the alliance, the 
North Atlantic Treaty of April 4th, 1949 is the cornerstone for 
                                                 
1 See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001),  pp. 29-
30  
2 Ibid, p. 30 
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all NATO publications, which introduces one to the principles of 
this organization.  The document consists of 14 articles, which 
discuss the official bases for alliance formation, goals, 
responsibilities, and cooperation.   
First and foremost, the Treaty requires all of its 
undersigned members to the best of their ability to resolve all 
of their international conflicts through peaceful means, thus 
avoiding the danger of armed confrontation, as well as promote 
the ideological understanding of their democratic processes, as 
a means for promoting international stability.  Second, the 
treaty categorically states that consultation among parties is 
required, when there is a credible threat to territorial 
security of any of the alliance members.  Third, the Treaty 
obliges its parties to take part in individual or collective use 
of force, when armed attack on any of its parties occurs, 
however, the Treaty does indicate that the UN Security Council 
shall have ultimate power over any security matters in the 
region.  Fourth, the Treaty establishes its priority over any 
previous arrangements between members and third parties, as well 
as bars its members from entering into any arrangements, which 
may potentially hinder its operation.  And at last, the Treaty 
establishes a mechanism for its revision (10-year waiting 
period, following its ratification), and for official detachment 
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of its members (following a 20-year waiting period from the 
Treaty’s ratification), as elaborated in the Treaty’s text.  
Further elaboration of NATO’s foundation is available in the 
NATO Handbook, which addresses the concerns discussed in the 
North Atlantic Treaty as those of mutual security, consultation, 
deterrence, and defense1.  The inter-governmental structures of 
the alliance (i.e. The North Atlantic Council, The Defense 
Planning Committee, etc.) were charged with the important task 
of carrying out those goals through constant consultation, 
coordination, and democratic means, and the nature of those 
establishments is dictated purely by their purpose. 
Security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is 
perceived as a matter far more complex than simple preservation 
of members’ sovereignties. Essentially, the interpretation of 
security by NATO members is that of mutual stability, 
transparency and understanding among them, which in turn 
decreases potential threats from outside coercion or influence. 
Achievement of the security objectives is seen as a matter of 
effective crisis management, and far-reaching partnerships in 
various spheres2. Consultation (a matter so closely examined as a 
tool of efficacy by George Liska), as a means for extended 
cooperation and mutual assurance of collective defense terms, is 
                                                 
1 See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), pp. 31-32 
2 Ibid, p. 32 
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seen as an essential method for avoiding conflict among members, 
when defense and deterrence agreements need to be made. Over the 
period of five decades, the structure of the alliance has grown 




DECONSTRUCTING THE PRE-NATO ALIGNMENT 
Not considering all of the policy and structural 
permutations that took place within the alliance in the post-
Soviet period, NATO was, in fact, a near-perfect example of 
Liska’s theory in action.  Here, the questions of ‘why?’, ‘how 
strong?’ and ‘with whom?’ in regards to alignments in Western 
Europe of the post-World War II era clearly indicate that 
objective alliance principles apply. If one dissects the 
alignment, cohesion, and efficacy factors and variables, the 
nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization falls well 
within the dogmas of objective alliance theory almost perfectly. 
Alignment of the future members could be seen as a textbook 
example of balancing of power within the region.  In his 
introduction to reasoning on power-balance alignments George 
Liska states that “no abstract criterion can supply reliable 
guidance in either making or analyzing alignments without 
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reference to concrete conditions and conflicts”1. Considering the 
expansionist policies of the Soviet Union, following the 
division of post-war Germany, such conditions can be easily 
identified as a catalytic factor for pre-NATO alignment.   
The matter of maximizing gains and sharing liabilities in 
national security matters of participating members echoes in the 
NATO Handbook’s chapter on Fundamental Security Tasks of the 
alliance: “NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom 
and security of all its members by political and military 
means…”2, as well as “[t]he fundamental principle underpinning 
the Alliance is a common commitment to mutual cooperation among 
member states, based on the indivisibility of their security”3.  
Here, the excerpt from the NATO Handbook echoes some of the 
workings of the ‘gains-liabilities’ model: in particular, the 
existence of protective mechanisms, addressing the primary 
objective (protection), as well as an allusion to cooperation 
for the greater good, which, undeniably, aims at addressing 
issues of regional stability, and wide-scale pooling of 
resources. That shifts the focus from the reasons for the 
alignment, towards the mechanisms of the impending organization. 
It is now a matter of addressing how strong this alliance should 
be, as well as which members the alliance should include. The 
                                                 
1 See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 26 
2 See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 30 
3 Ibid, p. 30. 
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question of how much alliance cohesion is considered necessary, 
in order for it to fulfill its purpose thereafter would allow 
for a test of the feasibility of George Liska’s theory with a 
50-year run of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  
 Factors of gains and liabilities serve as prime indicators 
of the strength of aligning factors, since the higher level of 
security, economic, and geopolitical gains would always lead to 
a stronger alliance than a lower level, according to objectivist 
alliance theory. Addressing the issues of gains and liabilities 
Liska writes: “Stability is threatened by material and political 
burdens and strains flowing from alliance, while gains consist 
in economies pooling of resources and in material and moral 
supports by allies”1.   
The forefathers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
have addressed this matter on several fronts.  Certainly, the 
matters of economic gains and provision of economic stability, 
based upon those of collective regional defense are self-
evident; however, the matters of liabilities are delicately 
addressed as to allow the participants in this organization the 
flexibility of political choice and participation, which would 
assure a reduction in material and political burdens, as 
discussed by Liska. Here, the focus of the NATO principles 
                                                 
1 See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 30 
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shifts towards a democratically open model: “It is an 
intergovernmental organization, in which member countries retain 
their full sovereignty and independence”1, as well as “[t]he 
resulting sense of equal security among the members of the 
Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in 
their national military capabilities, contributes to stability 
in the Euro-Atlantic area”2.   
However, the alignment that led up to the formation of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization cannot provide us with 
sufficient detail, explaining the enforcement mechanisms within 
the alliance, but can serve as a helpful indicator of strength 
of the intent among the future members to form this alliance.  
Practically speaking, the origins of the alliance could not 
describe the ensuing mechanism that endured far past its 
intended lifetime.  
The matters of gains and liabilities that were established 
as a part of the Treaty of Washington have been foreshadowed by 
the Treaty of Brussels, which was signed a year prior between 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great Britain3.  
Here, the groundwork has been established by declaring the 
parties willingness to seek cooperation in matters of 
democratic, political, and socio-cultural development.  A model 
                                                 
1 See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 31 
2 Ibid, p. 31 
3 Ibid, p. 20-26 
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for military cooperation between the Treaty members, and 
principles of subordination to the UN Security Council were 
later borrowed and expanded for its inclusion into the Treaty of 
Washington. The checks-and-balances mechanisms of consultation 
(Consultative Council), and response to military aggression were 
adopted as well.   
 To a large extent, the circumstance, which led to the 
alignment of states towards co-operation and signing of the 1949 
Treaty of Washington, and the required gains as well as the 
capability to carry the load of responsibilities, established 
the candidacy of future members in the alliance.  The 
participants of the Treaty of Brussels have understood the 
necessity for a defensively stronger alliance, since the threat 
of the Soviet expansion was far greater, and the force far more 
formidable, than their initial goals of curbing any possible 
future German aggression.  In that sense, the United States 
became a pivoting point for the organization of what has become 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Certainly, the United 
States were not the only member to complete this expansion of 
the Treaty of Brussels (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, 
and Portugal completed the expansion).  However, U.S. military 
capabilities, coupled with its new nuclear weapon capacity, and 
expansive resource base made U.S. participation eminent.   
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In addition, if we follow through with Liska’s principles 
of alignment to a core power, Liska’s model requires the 
existence of a conflict between the threat and a core power, so 
that weaker states find sufficient cause for a move towards a 
restrictive union.  In the case of the Treaty of Brussels, Great 
Britain could be seen as the core power, with the majority of 
the mainland European participants in the union still rebuilding 
following the war. The conflict over the division of control 
over the post-war Germany, as well as the provocative Soviet 
chess game in Eastern Europe proved to be a sufficient enough 
cause to shift the role of the core power towards the United 
States.  In addition, the conflict between the two core world 
ideologies (democratic and Communist) created a rivalry of 
global proportions, making the conflict (in terms of Liska’s 
theory) a dominant one, first on regional, and later on a global 
scale. 
 Having discussed the matters leading up to the signing of 
the Treaty of Washington, as well as the factors which 
influenced the character of the organization that formed as a 
result, allow me to examine the matters of cohesion and efficacy 
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
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NATO’S INSTRUMENTS OF COHESION AND ADVANCEMENT OF COMMON 
INTERESTS 
 Generally, the matters that serve as aligning factors among 
nations tend to carry their weight towards promoting alliance 
cohesion.  Here, a growing antagonism between former wartime 
allies was rooted deeply in ideological terms, and disagreements 
over the spoils of the war.  The bonds that existed and were 
strengthened between the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United 
States, and Great Britain during their meeting in Yalta were no 
match for ideological disparities of the post-war period.  
Growing anti-Communist sentiment was fueled by the division of 
Germany, and the Soviet ideological and military expansion into 
Eastern Europe.  Here, the ideological differences between the 
East and the West acted as a catalyst for search of common 
interests among those with similar ideological understandings.   
Therefore, Liska’s primary factor for alliance cohesion--
that being rationalization, on ideological grounds1--appears 
early in NATO’s history.  The matters of ideology are pre-
eminent in NATO’s purpose to such an extent, that their 
importance is reflected within the first few lines of the Treaty 
of Washington, as a part of its preamble.  The preamble assures 
that parties to the Treaty of Washington intend to live in peace 
                                                 
1 See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 61 
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with other nations and “are determined to safeguard their 
freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, 
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and 
the rule of law”1.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, Liska’s 
understanding of ideology is not only that of ties that bind, 
but also that of measures taken to turn an alliance into a 
‘living’ social institution, which may relieve some of the 
burdens, imposed by the alliance, and create a wider 
justification for uniting against a common threat2.  
By encouraging and promoting open political dialogue among the 
members of the alliance, as well as strengthening of socio-
cultural and economic ties, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization intended not only to promote stability based on 
common ideological principles, but also to offset the 
liabilities of being a part of this alliance by expanding the 
range and nature of its gains.  By establishing a Council with 
equal representation for members, the Treaty of Washington 
utilized the ideological principles that its signatories set out 
to protect, thus promoting ideological causes even further.  
Ideological constraints were made strong for a number of 
reasons.  First of all, the allies established the reason for 
cooperation between each other.  This proved to be beneficial to 
                                                 
1 See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 527 
2 See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 62 
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the good of the alliance from two perspectives: stronger allies 
received reassurance that the weaker allies would adhere to 
their commitment, as long as their national democratic process 
prevailed, whereas the weaker allies were safeguarded against 
the possible hegemony by stronger allies through democratic 
checks and balances.  Second of all, the participants’ reliance 
on democratic principles that found its reflection in the 11th 
Article of the Treaty of Washington secured the United States as 
a major ally by giving national democratic processes an upper 
hand over commitments to the Treaty:  “This Treaty shall be 
ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes”1.  In 
a manner, that stance provided leeway for America’s usual 
isolationist tactics, and allowed greater solidarity among 
allies. The United States tried its utmost to transfer the 
majority of liabilities associated with this new alliance to 
Western European shoulders2. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that the United States led 
the way in promoting creation of West German armed forces, as an 
attempt at decreasing their share of the burden.  Such armed 
forces generated ferocious opposition from the European side, 
particularly, at the hands of France. However, after a number of 
                                                 
1 See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 529 
2 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International 
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 29 
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revisions, the framework for a restricted West German army was 
devised, and later ratified.  By the beginning of the 1950’s, 
the Western European community strengthened their mutual 
defenses by inviting Greece and Turkey into the union.  Uneasy 
and reluctant first steps establishing the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization turned into a firm commitment from all of its 
participants in great part due to rising tensions between the 
Communist and the democratic world.  The Soviet interventions in 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and – later - in Afghanistan served to 
strengthen the Parties’ resolve, and commitment to common goals.   
 The issue of nuclear deterrence, oftentimes overlooked as a 
cohesive factor, played an integral part in the alliance’s 
development.  David Yost’s NATO Transformed touches upon this 
issue: “[A] primary issue throughout the Cold War was the 
credibility of what came to be known as U.S. ‘extended 
deterrence’”1.  As opposed to ‘central deterrence’ (or deterrence 
of threat to the U.S. itself), ‘extended deterrence’ was based 
upon the notion that U.S. nuclear capability, coupled with the 
nation’s commitment to the Treaty of Washington would curb any 
threats of aggression or coercion against U.S. allies in the 
face of possible U.S. nuclear retaliation.  Although, the 
multilateral nuclear cutbacks of the early 1990’s limited the 
                                                 
1 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International 
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 32-33 
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type of European-based nuclear munitions to gravity bombs, 
extended deterrence still serves as a valuable cohesive factor 
within NATO.   
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, theoretically, 
alliance cohesion is a matter of ideological foundations, 
diplomatic agreements and accords, and the balance of gains and 
liabilities.  Therefore, the ideological foundations, reinforced 
by Soviet expansionist tactics served as the primary cohesive 
factor.  Provisions of Article 11 (‘provisions carried out by 
Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes’) of the Treaty reduced the liabilities.  Alliance 
gains, sought in collective defense, were secured in Article 5: 
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defense … will assist the Party or 
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith…such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”1. 
 All of the aforementioned facts meet and exceed Liska’s 
expectations for alliance cohesion.  The Treaty of Washington 
                                                 
1 See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 528 
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was composed in perfect balance, and succeeded in establishing a 
lasting union of mutually-involved nations, based upon 
principles of solidarity and democracy. 
 
 
PRINCIPLES OF EFFICACY IN NATO’S OPERATIONAL STRATEGY 
   NATO’s strength and operational efficacy as a defensive 
alliance greatly supports the notions put forth in Liska’s work.  
Particularly, the counter-effects of cohesive factors have 
become self-evident over a period of years.  The scholar’s 
observation, regarding the decrease in national identity of 
nations involved in highly structured and cohesive alliances 
manifested itself in NATO’s UN voting practices, and other world 
matters.  In part, such behavior became an indicator of 
solidarity among the allies on world matters, but on the other, 
served as a sign of subtle coercive pressure from the core 
power’s side.   
 Such a coercive push, as you may recall, set in motion a 
number of activities within NATO’s early history. In many ways, 
there were attempts by the United States to shift its share of 
the burden further onto Europe’s shoulders.  To some extent, 
such U.S. behavior echoed its traditional isolationist policies, 
but largely reflected the US domestic political attitudes 
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towards any substantial involvement into the alliance.  David 
Yost, in his recollection of NATO’s early years, quotes 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s response to the Senate 
committee hearing on whether there would be substantial material 
commitment by the US to European collective defense: “The answer 
to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute ‘No’”1.  Such 
a climate, certainly, supported any existing conception of 
national freedom to make sovereign choices and decisions in 
matters of foreign policy.  
However typical those notions have been, the mood changed 
with the 1950 North Korean invasion, which was seen as nothing 
less than another Soviet expansionist move.  The political shift 
brought about organizational changes among new allies. The 
proposal by the United States of the European Defense Community 
(finally established in 1954), as well as Dwight Eisenhower’s 
appointment as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe were 
the first steps in establishing efficacious organizational 
structures within NATO2.   
 Liska’s theory on alliance efficacy outlines three key 
areas of integration, which have little interference with 
national interests of alliance parties: military field command, 
transportation and logistics, and individual specialization of 
                                                 
1 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International 
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 29 
2 See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p 26. 
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member-nations1.  In a sense, the integration of military 
resources was the primary item on the agenda of this defensive 
alliance. For this purpose, the Military Committee was formed, 
which included Military Representatives (acting on behalf of 
respective Chiefs of Defense, who constitute the highest 
military representative level in NATO) from all participating 
member-states.  The responsibilities of the Military Committee 
include making decisions with regards to defense issues, and 
recommending defensive strategies and plans of action to NATO’s 
Strategic Commanders in NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe2. Military and civil subordination within NATO is 
highly reflective of the goals and principles indicated in the 
Treaty of Washington.  In particular, the structural dependence 
on the power of national authorities underscores any 
organizational behavior within the alliance.  According NATO’s 
civil and military structure, the national authorities have the 
ultimate say in all final policy decisions of the alliance’s 
councils and committees, as reflected in the illustration below3.  
 
                                                 
1 See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 118 
2 See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), pp. 239-240 
3 Ibid, p. 517 
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Figure 1 NATO’s Civil and Military Structure 
 
 Streamlining of the policy decisions from specialized 
committees to national authorities became the first symbol of 
NATO’s efficacy in performance of its primary duties. 
 Matters of logistics, transportation, and material support 
were addressed through the organization of centralized means of 
material distribution and coordination.  NATO Maintenance and 
Supply Organization, and its Agency carry responsibility of 
managing armaments supplies and matters of maintenance in 
collective Allied arsenals.  Linked with a number of groups and 
organizations, which are responsible for matters of military and 
production logistics, air defense and traffic management, 
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communication, electronic warfare, meteorology, education, and 
research and development, that portion of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization ensures that the efforts of collective 
defense are well backed and its supply lines are well-
coordinated1.  In a very direct way, such integration of 
defensive and diplomatic efforts within the alliance is a good 
demonstration of Liska’s principles of ‘dual-purpose 
integration’2.  Here, the alliance members choose to act 
together, and are not driven to collective action through some 
sort of a coercive conflict.  Through provision of instruments 
of consultation, such a system imposes democratic checks-and-
balances upon its participants, thus limiting the scale and 
number of potential regional conflicts, and, nonetheless, offers 
quick reaction means for defensive cooperation, should the need 
arise.   
 Efficacy of any alliance is judged by its capacity to deter 
aggressive or coercive action by its adversary.  As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, flexibility and durability of any alliance 
can serve as a successful deterrent, and therefore, 
establishment of flexible and durable organizational structures 
is paramount not only to the survival of an alliance, but also 
to its deterrence potential.  In this matter, the North Atlantic 
                                                 
1 See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 305 
2 See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 
134 
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Treaty Organization overcame all odds.  The limitations of the 
democratic checks-and-balances imposed by the consulting bodies, 
and ultimately, restricted by the national authorities 
effectively deter and coerce any members of NATO from escalating 
any external or internal conflicts. The best example of such 
operation would be the mitigation of the conflict between Greece 
and Turkey over Cyprus.   
 However complex the structure of NATO’s operational 
mechanism may be, it has been constructed with durability and 
flexibility in mind, yet provides enough leeway for successful 
conflict mitigation.  In terms of Liska’s tools of alliance 
efficacy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents a 













CHAPTER 5: THE BEGINNINGS OF TRANSFORMATION  
 
 The materials leading up to this point were concerned with 
outlining the theoretical background behind NATO’s inception, 
cohesion, and efficacy, as well as its historical premises and 
organizational principles.  This chapter examines the 
transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its 
parts, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and to 
apply the same theoretical principles to the newly-transformed 
structure, in order to test their applicability.   
 The post-Soviet capitalist world has experienced a major 
change in its security concerns, as well as shifts in its 
diplomatic posture.  Many policy analysts argue that the world 
has finally entered a transitional phase, when force is no 
longer a prevailing factor, and the rule of law is used to 
resolve any or all disputes and disagreements.  As an example of 
such shift, supporters of that theory cite the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1991, as the first step towards true European unification, 
whether in political, defensive, or economic matters. In a 
sense, that view displaces the Realist perspective, which 
insists that security and balance of power concerns are 
necessary, in order to maintain the status quo in contemporary 
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foreign policy1.   Particularly, the article by Robert J. Art 
stresses the tacit understanding among leaders of Western 
European nations that NATO is needed as a balancing and 
restrictive tool for parties in the alliance.  The unification 
of Germany and its rapid economic growth raised concerns within 
the German government, regarding possible reaction against 
Germany by its neighbors (perhaps, an intra-NATO balancing 
realignment), as commented on by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
in 19952.  That particular comment convinced Art that Realist 
matters of power balance and security are still very pertinent 
in contemporary European politics3.  Art’s take on such 
unification moves, as debates on plausibility of the European 
Political Union (EPU) or the European Defense Identity (EDI) is 
clear: they only prove that European dependence on the unified, 
yet pluralistic security community is a manifestation of the 
European elites’ fear of disintegration of internal security 
arrangements.  After all, history shows that the general efforts 
of the United States to unify Europe, for the sake of the 
greater good and economic ‘better’, served well to construct a 
balanced and secure Western European community, one which was 
                                                 
1 See Robert J. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO”, Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 111-1 (Spring, 1996), p. 1 
2 R. Art quoting Helmut Kohl: “Germany’s dominance would necessarily provoke fear and 
envy among all our neighbors and move them toward common action against Germany”, “Why 
Western Europe Needs United States and NATO”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111-1, 
(Spring 1996), p. 2. 
3 Ibid, p. 2 
 73
previously riddled with nationalism and multilateral foreign 
policy initiatives.  On the other hand, since the mission of 
NATO was to curb potential Soviet aggression towards the West, 
it has accomplished far more. It has created an internal bond 
and regulation, like that of a collective security arrangement, 
designed to mitigate conflicts between involved parties1. From 
the standpoint of Edwin Fedder, in his book NATO: The Dynamics 
of Alliance in the Postwar World, the unique nature of the 
alliance created benefits and gains for all parties involved, 
including the U.S., which benefited from a stable a loyal 
Western European community.     
Although, it would be foolhardy to assume that years of 
peaceful co-existence between such neighbors as France and 
Germany would immediately revert to nationalist violence, in the 
event of US withdrawal of its European presence.  What does 
become possible, according to Art, is a spreading 
multilateralism in numerous areas of previous  
cooperation. This would lead to nothing less than the wasteful 
expenditure of national funds plus reversion to regional power 
politics2.  Thus, the entire principle of indivisibility of 
                                                 
1 See Edwin H. Fedder, NATO: The Dynamics of Alliance in the Postwar World. (New York: 
Dodd, Mead & Co., 1973), p. 2 
2 See Robert J. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO”, Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 111-1 (Spring, 1996), p. 5 
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regional security is abandoned, unless a core power from outside 
the region is present.   
This is a paradox in itself, yet a paradox, for which there 
exists an explanation.  First, the Realist perspective on 
importance of national security is apt, if one considers the 
historical prevalence of nationalist power plays in Western 
Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Second, the 
concepts of alliance cohesion and efficacy outlined by Liska 
find their niche in the contemporary European environment.  
Although, the matters of deterrence of outside threats still 
exist, the issues of internal balancing and alignment take 
charge.  Where initially, NATO’s role as a Western European 
security blanket prevailed, this laid a foundation of continuing 
diplomacy for promoting continuing solidarity beyond the 
existence of a common threat.  If one were to agree with such 
scholars as Robert Art, then Europe needs NATO now just as much 
as it did in 1949.  To a very large extent, such a view supports 
traditional Realist view on alliances, although it shifts the 
focus from the existing arrangements from external threats to 
internal diplomacy.  In addition, the theories put forth by 
Stephen Walt suggest that the mere perception of possible danger 
can be a cohesive or aligning factor.  Sean Kay writes on NATO’s 
persistence: “Fear of instability and the unknown can be as much 
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a unifying factor as a clear and present danger.”1  Here, once 
again fears of instability due to the growing influence of a 
united Germany come into play, while inclusion of some Central 
and Eastern European nations into NATO is seen as balancing 
Germany’s influence.     
 As an addition to the Realist emphasis on the importance of 
security as a strengthening factor, some analysts, such as 
Robert McCalla, add additional factors, reinforcing the NATO’s 
persistence following the demise of the Soviet threat.  
Particularly, McCalla points out that for alliances with a high 
organizational factor (such as NATO), the impact of a threat 
disappearance would be mitigated, by the existence of an 
organizational structure that supports the alliance.  In 
addition, McCalla argues that the factors favoring dissolution 
would also be mitigated if an alliance performs other functions 
beyond its central goal of collective defense2.  Here, the author 
makes the case for institutionalism and its prevalence in 
contemporary international affairs: although NATO could happily 
claim that it has accomplished its goal, while its members 
expanded the range of their concerns, since there is the 
                                                 
1 See Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security. (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield Pub., 1998), p. 7 
2 See Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International 
Organization, Vol. 50-3 (Summer, 1996), p. 470 
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possibility of utilizing a well-oiled and seasoned international 
machine to deal with any new threats.   
The argument suggests that NATO could utilize existing 
methods and principles to deal with emerging security concerns, 
re-organize (if necessary), in order to meet new requirements, 
and use its diplomatic ‘weight’ in order to fulfill policy goals 
in its interaction with other actors1.  Thus, the high degree of 
organization and commitment to institutional principles becomes 
a sure sign supporting NATO’s longevity.  In addition to the 
institutional component of this theoretical approach, McCalla 
proposes that a ‘regime’ nature of NATO’s external and internal 
policy attitudes, which reduce parties’ costs and liabilities by 
providing settled behavior patterns for all participating 
members, could also be a contributing factor to the 
organization’s durability2. 
 Although it would be quite early to reach a conclusion with 
regards to NATO’s longevity, based upon a limited analysis of 
theoretical assumptions of policy scholars, without any 
practical assertions of their accuracy, those assumptions can be 
summarized nonetheless.  As mentioned previously, in the 
analysis of Liska’s theory, alliance characteristics are 
                                                 
1 See Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International 
Organization, Vol. 50-3 (Summer, 1996), p. 464 
2 Ibid, p. 462 
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discussed according to its principles of alignment, cohesion, 
and efficacy.   
In this specific case, fears of internal re-alignment 
become a critical matter for one of the allies, seeking to 
maintain NATO presence in Europe as a balancing tool.  In 
addition, efficient organizational and institutional parameters, 
which were characterized in the previous chapter as signs of 
flexibility and durability of the alliance, are present, thus 
signifying that NATO was built to outlast its opponents. In 
addition, members of NATO may find (as institutional theory 
suggests) that maintaining, and restructuring the current union 
may be less costly than organizing a completely new structure.  
Therefore, theoretically, post-Soviet NATO is characterized by 
issues of internal security fears, organizational stability and 
durability, and, since internal security fears dictate a need 
for such an arrangement, significant cost-benefit advantages 
over completely new arrangements.  
   A new perspective on NATO’s organizational and 
institutional character arises, as that of an international 
institution, rather than simply a limited regional security 
arrangement.  By characterizing the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization as a security institution rather than a security 
arrangement, this places a more formal nature upon the 
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organization’s practices, and generally identifies the 
institution as the one responsible for the security of its 
respective members.  Therefore, institutionalism establishes 
NATO as a more long-lasting and encompassing arrangement than 
the previously seen unilateral defensive arrangement.   
This offers a conflicting view from a traditional Realist 
approach, which considers institutional arrangements as more of 
a secondary factor, rather than a primary contributing factor to 
collective security. In lieu of power and economic competition 
among alliance members, even the strongest of former allies may 
come to odds on valid issues, which indicates that institutional 
arrangements alone would not serve to prevent such conflicts.  
However traditional that approach may be, proponents of 
institutionalism suggest that the true value of international 
institutions’ capacity to serve as a provision for international 
security can be readily tested and proven: their worth as 
security providers is assured by their establishment of norms of 
international cooperation beyond traditional rule of power.  
Historically, however, some of the most benignly conceived 
institutions failed to protect their members from aggression 
through collective action, the best example of that being the 
League of Nations. This was exemplified by the failure of the 
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organization to enforce its Articles upon Italy during the 
Italo-Ethiopian crisis of 1934-351.  
The nature of restructuring decisions within NATO, 
following the end of the Cold War, led many analysts to believe 
that the power of the institution was on the decline, as 
evidenced by its ‘ad hoc responses to the changes in the 
international environment’2.  The realist-institutionalist debate 
permeates the post-Cold War nature of the alliance, perfectly 
setting up the grounds for the analysis of its transformation. 
 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION IN ACTION 
 David Yost dedicated his entire publication NATO 
Transformed to NATO’s shift from traditional security 
enforcement arrangement towards its new role in the future of 
Europe.  Yost touches upon a number of similar concerns voiced 
by a number of his colleagues following the end of the Cold War: 
that of US involvement in the European security affairs, and 
that of balancing Germany’s influence, as well as maintaining 
interest in joint European defense planning, as opposed to 
nationalist efforts. However, the bulk of his work is dedicated 
                                                 
1 See George Gill, The League of Nations: 1929-1946. (New York: Avery Pub., 1996), pp. 
35-51. 
2 See Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security. (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlfield Pub., 1998), p. 11 
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to NATO’s cooperation with Eastern European countries, matters 
of peace and security maintenance within and outside the region, 
as well as potential for the change in the nature of this 
security arrangement.   
Besides those primary goals, the leadership of the alliance 
was faced with the collapse of the Soviet empire. It also sought 
to drastically reorganize its internal structure, in order to 
promote solidarity among the existing allies, as well as promote 
the emergence of the European Security and Defense Identity.  A 
greater level of flexibility was also sought: one aimed at 
maintaining combat readiness in non-traditional NATO roles, such 
as crisis management, and co-operation with non-NATO countries.1
Albeit such a shift in interests and structural 
characteristics might seem surprising to some, it indicates a 
number of very important movements, which took place within the 
organization.  First and foremost, the move towards co-operation 
with former enemies also aims to promote stability.  The 
standoff between former adversaries would no longer have the 
same effect that it did in the early years.  In addition, making 
the friendly terms formal would establish an institutional 
relationship between the alliance and numerous non-aligned 
states.  Second, the shift in the alliance’s defensive role, 
                                                 
1 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International 
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 72 
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towards a peacekeeping and crisis-management model maintained 
the pressure on the allies to continue the organization by re-
defining the security threat.  And at last, structural push for 
solidarity and flexibility is aimed at promoting the alliance’s 
durability, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, since 
the staying power of the international organizations is very 
often predicated on those simple characteristics.  Allow me to 
elaborate on those matters. 
For members of NATO, collaboration with Eastern European 
nations signified a new phase of European development.  However 
stable the Soviet Union could have seemed, its presence is no 
longer a factor in NATO’s security policies, and prompted a 
search for new definition for Europe’s vision of stability and 
peace.  The general objectives of “just and lasting peaceful 
order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees”1, 
as addressed by the Harmel Report lost its mark, with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, re-unification of Germany, and 
the process of democratization in Eastern Europe.  
Seemingly, the number of opinions on the future of NATO 
outnumbered the number of realistic solutions.  However, the 
general attitude of solidarity prevailed: NATO could accomplish 
the same feat of integration in Eastern Europe in the early 
                                                 
1 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International 
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 92 
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1990’s, as it had done in the Western Europe during the early 
1950’s1. 
  Moreover, NATO members maintained their focus on their 
traditional matters even more vigorously, curbing any 
possibility that the disappearance of the collective threat may 
allow the re-emergence of historical Western European power 
arrangements.  Yost comments on this subject: “That the Allies 
are in fact aware of such risks, intend to hedge against them, 
and wish to sustain the Alliance’s traditional functions while 
undertaking new missions has been evident”2.   
For the first time, since the establishment of NATO in 
1949, the Kantian formula of indivisible security re-emerged in 
negotiations between Russia and NATO in 1997, aimed at grounding 
that formula in common democratic values, norms, and 
commitments3.  Organizations, such as the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace reached out 
beyond NATO’s traditional scope of cooperation, providing 
vehicles of collaboration for NATO members and their non-NATO 
partners.  Among those organizations, the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) has seemingly reached its vast range of goals, which were 
                                                 
1 Yost on a comment made by Madeleine Albright, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New 
Roles in International Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 
92 
2 Ibid, p. 93 
3 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International 
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 93 
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not limited to simple defense cooperation, but also incorporated 
humanitarian issues, as well as disaster management, and search 
and rescue.   
Nonetheless, NATO’s push for stability re-emerged once 
more, when the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed its commitment 
to consult on the matters of security with any PfP participant, 
whenever there is a perceived direct threat to that partner’s 
security or independence.  In practice, PfP was able to achieve 
enormous levels of cooperation, including combat and crisis 
readiness among the partners through logistical integration of 
communications, collective defense planning, and burden sharing 
among partners in the matters of bringing the new partners up to 
the standard level of readiness.  
Enlargement of NATO became the culmination of the efforts 
of the alliance and the world community to promote stability in 
Europe, as well as to promote cooperation among former 
adversaries1.  Although the advocates of enlargement were highly 
diverse, the general rationales for such a move were grounded in 
promoting democracy in the reforming Eastern European community, 
as well as establishing common standards for collective efforts 
among former adversaries, in order to bring the latter to the 
level of consultation, exemplified by their Western European 
                                                 
1 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International 
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 92. 
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counterparts.  However long-winded such analysis of NATO’s 
efforts for cooperation with former enemies may be, only one 
particular goal characterizes the alliance’s efforts: lasting 
pan-European stability.  
Although, the role of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization as a deterrent of the Soviet aggression and 
coercion became non-existent with the disappearance of the 
Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation 
remained a factor in reconfiguring the new security 
arrangements.  Prior to that, alliance doctrine limited the 
scope of NATO’s security engagement to the territories and 
forces of the NATO members.  However, mainly due to the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, redefinition of that doctrine and 
the limitations of NATO’s engagement occurred.  Particularly, 
the focus has shifted towards establishing and maintaining 
stability and security in Eastern and Central Europe, and 
preventing any internal and external conflicts in the region.  
The potential for an armed conflict growing beyond the borders 
of the initial engagement, and spilling over into NATO 
territories forced the change in NATO’s defensive strategies.  
As a result of this policy shift, the alliance’s involvement in 
the early 1990’s Yugoslavian crisis was the first actual test of 
the new arrangement.  When all diplomatic attempts at containing 
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and pacifying the conflict failed, NATO got involved in 
establishing peace in former Yugoslavia in 1992.  Those efforts 
were not simply directed at maintaining NATO’s prestige in the 
eyes of the world community, but also became direct means for 
the conflict containment and regional stabilization that has 
been NATO’s forte for several decades, and now in a new era.   
The role of Russian Federation in the conflict is 
paramount.  In the earlier period of the conflict, Russian 
policy indicated a full support of Western efforts in the 
region. Swayed by internal pressures, the Russia’s accommodating 
tone has changed to a neutral position, and established a pro-
Serbian attitude1. Such likely shifts in Russia’s foreign policy 
have prompted concern from the European community, and to some 
extent, they allowed for a continuation of NATO’s role as a 
balance-of-power mechanism.  
When it became evident that crisis management and peace 
operations were now the added challenge, NATO proceeded to re-
organize its assets and structures into more flexible and 
independent entities. In particular, the establishment of the 
new Combined Joint Task Forces as an attempt to separate the 
burdens of various engagements between allies and to avoid 
maintaining a single complex system.  The key phrases have now 
                                                 
1 Roger E. Kanet, Edward A. Kolodziej. Coping with Conflict after the Cold War. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 60-61 
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become “timely response” and “flexibility”, and “separable but 
not separate military capabilities”1.   
The growing desire among Western European nations (France, 
in particular) to establish a European Security and Defense 
Identity was an attempt to improve the balance of the European-
American diplomatic relations. It has encountered a number of 
hurdles, such as the lack of European logistical capabilities 
and debates on the role of ESDI, most of which have already been 
overcome by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  This, 
therefore, serves as an assurance that NATO has slowly, but 
steadily assumed its new role as the guarantor of stability in 
the European region, and possesses a greater capacity and 
success potential than any of its potential successors.   
However contentious the issue of NATO succession has been, 
the prospects for further integration into the fabric of the 
European community are positive from numerous perspectives: its 
role as a balancing organization has effects internally as well 
as externally. NATO is reforming to meet new security 
challenges, and seeking to promote regional stability.  All of 
those matters meet with various levels of support from a 
majority of the participants in the debate over NATO’s 
feasibility, its enlargement, and its future.  Gale Mattox, in 
                                                 
1 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International 
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 201-202 
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an essay analyzing the NATO debate, concludes: “Reaching out to 
those countries not formally members, it has the ability to 
stabilize and secure peace on the continent”1.   
If NATO intends to follow through with its intended goals, 
and faces its challenges, in spite of continuing criticism, 
several different avenues for its efforts should be addressed. 
Those encompass its reduced focus on collective defense matters, 
continuing participation of the United States in European 
affairs, understanding of limitations of NATO’s involvement in 
collective defense affairs, and a clarification of NATO’s goals 
while following the traditional defense doctrine, as well as the 
new security track2. 
To a large extent, the challenge of downgraded focus on 
collective defense has been addressed.  In the absence of direct 
threat, NATO leadership has successfully redefined the 
alliance’s role in European stability.  However, the limitations 
that the new threat of instability poses, in turn, impose limits 
on the practical potential of members’ involvement in security 
matters.  The best example of such limitations could be seen in 
US reluctance regarding its initial ground involvement in the 
Yugoslavian crisis.  In particular, that crisis indicates that 
                                                 
1 See Gale Mattox “New Realities, New Challenges,” in Enlarging NATO: The National 
Debates, ed. Gale Mattox and Arthur Rachwald (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub., 2001), p. 
255 
2 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International 
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 272 
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the new doctrine, however current it may be, does not achieve 
those solidarity levels reminiscent of the ones that 
characterized the Soviet threat.  In that sense, the US role and 
its level of involvement in NATO’s peacekeeping and crisis 
management endeavors serves as an indicator of NATO’s future and 
its capacity to uphold its goals, since intermittent and 
reluctant participation of the US in those matters significantly 
weakens the alliance.  Such reluctance could be drastically 
reduced by clarifying the new divergence of doctrine foci, 
prompted by the disappearance of the key threat, and confirming 
new grounds for collective defense: those of European stability 
in the face of the emergence of new nations; the potential for 
the re-emergence of Western European power plays; and, future 
need to perform potential collective defense functions.  
Although the chance still stands that the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization will go through substantial policy and structural 
changes, in order to meet the new challenges, its steadfast 
commitment to solidarity and cooperation in the European region 
meets the current challenges head on.  David Yost confirms the 
effectiveness and durability of the alliance in the conclusion 
to his work: “NATO remains the single most effective institution 
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for combining the political-military assets of the Western 




























                                                 
1 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International 
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 301 
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CHAPTER 6: A VISION FOR NEW NATO 
 
 In five decades of its existence, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization has passed through a number of phases, and boldly 
entered a new era of international politics as a seasoned tried 
and true establishment of collective defense.  Previously, bound 
by stringent ties of solidarity in the face of the Soviet 
threat, the great alliance in the new era has accomplished its 
transition and performed a searching inventory of its strengths 
and weaknesses, aiming at continuing its successful existence.  
The expansion of its cause to new levels of cooperation in the 
European region points out the fervent desire of the 
organization’s leadership and participants to reassure their 
respective populations and constituencies of continuing 
stability in the political and economic arenas.  Although the 
new branches and organizations that sprouted in Europe following 
the collapse of the Soviet regime have indicated that 
alternative means and tools of stabilization exist, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization maintained its lead.  Even though 
the shared responsibilities of the NATO participants gradually 
increased as the membership grew, and new goals were drawn up, 
the parties to the Treaty maintained their solidarity in pursuit 
of crisis management and peacekeeping with little variation.  
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Such an outcome is viewed from a number of perspectives.  On one 
hand, the internal mitigation and conflict resolution mechanisms 
become more important than ever, and the role of NATO as a 
collective security arrangement is paramount to organizational 
stability. On the other hand, the relative instability of 
Russian foreign policy, as characterized by domestic policy of 
non-accommodation to the Western ideology1, reinforce NATO’s role 
as a balance-of-power tool. 
 Having introduced the principles of George Liska’s realist 
theory on alliance cohesion, alignment, and efficacy, I have 
illustrated the applicability of those principles to formation 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its operating 
doctrine, and structure. Then, I aimed at illustrating the 
transformation of NATO’s cause, immediate and long-term goals, 
and the continued applicability of realist principles to NATO’s 
affairs.   
The sole intention of such progressive illustration was to 
reaffirm that, in practice, although the key security threat to 
an alliance may have dissolved, NATO maintained its commitment 
to a common goal by re-shaping its prerogatives.  The 
flexibility and institutional nature of NATO has created a 
diplomatic legacy, or a political regime, which now dictates a 
                                                 
1 Roger E. Kanet, Edward A. Kolodziej. Coping with Conflict after the Cold War. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1996), p. 60 
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political framework of its own. In a sense, the institution that 
was solidified through NATO’s enduring existence provides a 
sufficiently stable and predictable European political 
environment that would be hard to replace, if it were to become 
defunct.  Therefore, the precept that was addressed in the first 
chapter is correct: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
through its institutional transformation has transcended its 
role as a traditional defensive alliance.   
Certainly, any comprehensive analysis of a complex 
collective defense mechanism, such as NATO should reach beyond 
realism, and incorporate institutional theory, and perhaps, neo-
objectivist approaches to international theory. In that sense, 
attempting to predict NATO’s future behavior, solely using the 
method and information utilized in this work, will yield one-
dimensional results. A single-theory approach does not possess 
the full breadth necessary for understanding all policy and 
institutional changes.  
However, it is important to reiterate the key research 
question of this work: Do realist and neo-realist theories of 
alliance formation and cohesion, as outlined by George Liska, 
explain the constraints of NATO’s cohesion throughout its term 
of existence?  The answer to this question is a complex, yet a 
well-founded, yes.  If one were to strip down any realist or 
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neo-realist approach down to its bones, the key principle of 
cooperation between states is a security threat, or a mere 
possibility thereof, to the states’ sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, or their forces.  Beyond all doubt, it is evident 
that Liska’s realist approach is still useful in interpreting 
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